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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sought specific performance of an option to purchase 
certain realty situated in Wasatch County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was previously tried and reversed on <;ippeal. (See 
Hidden Meadows Development Co •• v. Mills, 29 U. 2d 469, 511 P. 2d 737.) 
After remand the trial court ordered specific performance upon 
the payment to defendants Mills of the sum of $87,800.00 (R. 232-236), and 
the payment to defendant International Environmental Sciences the sum of 
$35,000. 00 under its counterclaim for improvements to the land as an 
occupying claimant (R. 243-245.) 
The trial court also entered Judgment against defendant Mills on 
the cross complaint of the other defendants (successors-in-interest of the land 
in question from defendants Mills) requiring the Mills to refund their purchase 
price in the sum of $110, 000. 00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Mills, by this appeal, seek an order modifying the 
decree of specific performance to require plaintiff as a condition of specific 
performance to compensate defendants Mills for the reasonable value of capi-
tal improvements constructed by them upon the land in question after the date 
of the execution of the option to purchase. 
-1-
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Defendants Mills also seek an order modifying the Judgment in 
favor of the other defendants (cross claimantsbelow) to allow Defendant Mills 
credit against the Judgment in the sum of $35,000.00. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 28, 1964, Dee Mills and Evelyn Mills, his wife, 
executed an option in favor of the predecessor in interest of the Hidden 
Meadows Development Co., a joint venture comprised of two limited part· 
nerships (Plaintiff and Respondent herein). The option gave the optionee 
the right to purchase the Mills' farm containing approximately 540 acres of 
land in Wasatch County, Utah. 
The option, which specified a termination date of December 31, 
1965, also contained a provision which stated as follows: 
"This contract is automatically renewed from year to 
year unless notice of cancellation is given by either 
party prior to October 1 of any given year." 
On August 31, 1971, Mills gave notice of cancellation to Hidden 
Meadows and on September 14, 1971, granted an option to Milton A. 
Christensen to purchase the property for $110,000.00. On September 28, 
1971, Hidden Meadows sent Mills a notice that it intended to exercise the 
option. 
Subsequently, Hidden Meadows brought suit against Mills, 
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Christensen and others to enforce the option. After trial, the lower Court 
(Judge D. Frank Wilkins) entered Judgment for defendants and quieted title 
to the property in defendants and barred plaintiff from asserting title thereto. 
The matter was subsequently appealed to this court and on July 
5, 1973, a decision was rendered reversing the decision of the lower court. 
(See, Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, 29 U. 2d 469, 511 P. 2d 737.) 
In connection with the former appeal, Hidden Meadows (as appell-
ant) applied to the trial court for a supersedeas and an injunction preventing 
the defendants (Mills and Christensen) from disposing of the property during 
the pendency of the appeal. The court on November 29, 1972, granted the 
Motion for Supersedeas and Injunction, contingent upon Hidden Meadows 
posting bond in the amount of$ 50, 000. 00. However, Hidden Meadows failed 
to post any bond, and the supersedeas and injunction never issued. 
During the pendency of the appeal, and prior to the reversal, 
other persons obtained interests in the subject property. Specifically, 
Milton Christensen assigned his option rights to Carole Lee Davis who en-
tered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract of purchase with defendants Mills 
on January 2. 1973, by the terms of which she agreed to purchase the Mills' 
property for $110, 000.00. (Ex. 19-D.) The purchase price in full was paid 
on or before April 5, 1973. 
The remittitur on the appeal was issued on July 26, 1973, and 
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on August 27, 1973, the district court on motion of plaintiff and without a 
hearing entered a Decree of Specific Performance requiring defendants to 
execute a Warranty Deed conveying the property to plaintiff, and ordering 
plaintiff to pay $86,200.00 in payment of the purchase price thereof. 
A copy of the Decree was mailed to Gordon I. Hyde (then counsel 
for defendants) on August 2, 1973, which was 25 days before it was signed 
by the court. 
However, the executed copy of the Decree of Specific Performanci 
was not served on Mr. Hyde until October 26, 1973. Subsequently, on or 
about November 7, 1973, defendants, through their then counsel, Gordon I. 
Hyde, filed an objection to the Decree of Specific Performance, but no hear-
ing was ever held thereon. 
On or about June 17, 197 4, plaintiff filed a suppelemental complaint 
in which it sought to join additional defendants, claiming that Carole Lee 
Davis and her successors in interest were not bona fide purchasers. In 
addition to denying the allegations of plaintiff's supplemental complaint, all 
defendants cross-claimed against their predecessors in interest, back to 
defendants Mills, for a return of the purchase price paid by them. 
Atthetrial, defendants Mills sought to show that subsequent to 
the execution of their option to plaintiffs, defendants Mills (with the know!edr< 
-4-
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and approval of plaintiff) had put certain improvements on the property. 
Exhibit 35-D was admitted into evidence. (Cooley transcript 
p. 307) This was a letter from plaintiff to defendant Mills which stated: 
September 25, 1967 
Dea;r:- Mr. Mills: 
"We wish to officially recognize the expenditure 
of $8, 000. 00 you have made on construction of your 
dairy barn, for which you will be indemnified on a 
ten year depreciation basis (co=encing as of May 1, 
1967) at the time of our purchase of your land." 
Sincerely, 
Robert K. Allen, General Partner 
Hidden Meadows of the Wasatch 
Subsequently, Mills testified that the $8,000.00 referred to in 
the letter related only to the cost of materials going into the barn and did 
not include any amount for labor (Cooley transcript pp. 307-308.) He also 
testified that in his opinion the value of the barn was $12,000.00 to $15,000.00 
at the time it was, b..!ilt, and that it was worth about the same amount at the 
date of the hearing (Cooley transcript p. 311). 
Defendant Mills did not claim that he had agreed to the terms of 
Exhibit 35-D, but only that the exhibit amounted to a recognition on the part 
-5-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of plaintiff that defendant Mills would be additionally compensated for the 
barn upon a purchase of the ground. (Cooley transcript p. 308.) Thereupon 
the trial court reversed his ruling and refused to admit Exhibt 35-D. (Cooley 
transcript p. 309. ) 
Defendant Mills also testified that subsequent to the execution of 
the option he made other capital improvements to the land in question. Part 
of this was in the form of testimony by defendant Mills (Cooley transcript 
pp. 312-314), and part was in the form of a proffer of proof (Cooley transcript 
pp. 318-323). Unfortunately, the reporter failed to copy the total proffer, ana 
part was omitted duringthe portion noted by the reporter as "off the record". 
(Cooley transcript p. 318.) 
The proffer of proof is as follows: 
11PROFFER OF PROOF 
"TlB. t Dee Mills, if permitted, would testify that subsequent to 
December 28, 1964 (the date of the option to plaintiff) he made capital im-
provements to the property in dispute to the extent of at least $16,748.17 in 
cash paid out, which figure does not include labor he personally expended in 
installing these improvements. 
"That among the improvements was a barn which he constructed 
over a period of two years, upon which he expended $8,000.00 for IIB. terials 
alone, and that the value of the barn would be approximately $15,000.00. 
-6-
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That plaintiff was aware of the construction of the said barn, and through 
Robert K. Allen, general partner, recognized in writing the expenditure of 
$8, 000. 00 for the barn and offered to compensate Mills for the barn, over 
and above the option price. 
"That in addition, Mills installed other capital improvements as 
follows: 
Fencing (materials only) $ 1188.82 
Septic tank (materials only) 354. 48 
Improvements to reservoir and irrigation 
ditches 2333.20 
Purchase of additional reservoir rights 2462. 71 
Improvements to house and garage (materials 
only 1655.66 
Miscellaneous 753.30 
"That Mills also levelled and brought under cultivation five acres 
of land, which increased its value by about $12,000.00. 
"That plaintiff (through Robert K. Allen, general partner) was 
aware of most, if not all of these improvements, because he and Mills dis-
cussed them and Allen represented and agreed that Mills would be addition-
ally compensated for the improvements if and when plaintiff exercised its 
option. 
-7-
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"That subsequent to his sale and conveyance to Carole Lee Davis 
he re-purchased from her the house in which he is living and five acres of 
land in exchange for cattle and farm machinery having a reasonable and 
agreed value of $35, 000.00." (End of Proffer of Proof.) 
Plaintiff objected to the proffer of proof which was sustained by 
the trial court upon the ground that the proffer was "completely immaterial 
under the facts of this case." ( Cooley transcript p. 323.) 
Thereafter, the court entered a supplemental Decree of Specific 
Performance requiring all defendants to convey the land in question to p laintii:' 
upon the payment to Mills of the sum of $87,800.00 (R. 232-236), and the pay-
ment to defendant International Environmental Sciences the sum of $35,000.00 
under its counter claim for improvements to the land as an occupying claim· 
out. (R. 243-245.) 
The trial court also entered Judgment against defendants Mills 
on the cross complaint of the other defendants requiring them to refund the 
sum of $110,000.00 
All parties have appealed from various elements of the decision 
of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE 
-8-
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PLAINTIFF AS A CONDITION OF SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE TO COMPENSATE DEFENDANTS MILLS 
FOR THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE CAPITAL 
IMPROVEMENTS CONSTRUCTED BY THEM UPON 
THE LAND IN QUESTION AFTER THE DATE OF THE 
EXECUTION OF THE OPTION TO PURCHASE. 
At the trial defendants Mills sought to introduce evidence con-
cerning certain capital improvements constructed by them upon the land 
which was the subject of the option agreement after the execution of the 
option. Defendants 1 evidence would show that defendant Mills had discussed 
these improvements with the general partner of plaintiff, who had agreed that 
the Mills would be additionally compensated for the improvements if and when 
the option were exercised. (Cooley transcript pp. 320-321.) 
In addition, the court first admitted (Cooley transcript p. 307), 
then rejected (Cooley transcript p. 309) Exhibit 35-D, which is a written 
recognition executed by the general partner of plaintiff that it knew defen-
dants Mills were constructing a barn on the subject property and that they 
were to be compensated additionally for it. Even though the court refused 
to receive Exhibit 35-D, the Findings of Fact refer to Exhibit 35-D and state 
that thereby plaintiff agreed to adjust the purchase price for the property to 
reflect the addition of the barn. However, the trial court allowed only the 
sum of $1, 600. 00 based upon the amortization formula contained in that 
letter. (R. 227.) 
-9-
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It was not the position of defendants Mills that they had agreed 
-
to this formula (Cooley transcript p. 308-309), which is the reason the 
court reversed its prior admission of the exhibit. Rather, the position of 
defendants Mills was that the letter constituted a recognition on the part of 
plaintiff that the Mills were to receive additional compensation, but that the 
Mills had never agreed that the amount was to be $8,000. 00, or that the 
value was to be reduced over a ten (10) year period. (Cooley transcript 
pp. 306-311.) 
The option in question was executed on December 28, 1964. 
By its terms, it was an option for one year. However, it contained a provi-
sion which automatically continued the option from year to year unless one 
side gave the other notice of cancellation. (See Exhibit 1-P. ) 
During the option period defendants Mills occupied the premises 
and operated the property as a dairy farm and for grazing of livestock 
(Cooley transcript p. 293.) During this period defendants n:ade several 
capital improvements on the land, which they discussed with plaintiff and 
which plaintiff agreed to pay for upon the exercise, if any, of the option. 
(Cooley transcript pp. 320-321.) The dairy barn is one example of such 
improvements. Exhibit 35-D is clear evidence that the plaintiff was made 
aware of the improvement, and that additional compensation was to be paid 
over and above the purchase price upon any exercise of the option. 
-10-
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Defendants Mills proffer of proof included other capital improve-
ments totalling $35, 748. 17 (including the estimated value of the barn) which 
were added to the property after discussion with plaintiff. 
There is substantial legal precedent for adjusting the purchase 
price upon which the option may be exercised under circumstances similar 
to the case at bar. 
In Fontaine v. Brown County Motors, Co., 251 Wise 433, 29 Now. 
2d 7 44 (194 7) it appeared that Fontaine had leased certain property to the 
Motor Company on March 31, 1941, for a term of five years, commencing 
June 15, 1941. At that time, lessee owned property adjoining the leased pro-
perty on both sides. The lease contained an option whereby the ~ had 
the right to purchase the adjoining property of the lessee for the fixed price 
of $35,000.00 at anytime during the term of the lease. 
In November, 1945, the lessee began the construction of a one 
story warehouse on its adjoining property. While the president of the lessee 
corporation was aware of the option at the time the lease was executed, he 
had forgotten it at the time construction commenced. On April 30, 1946, 
Fontaine gave the lessee a notice exercising the option to purchase. At 
that time the lessee had expended approximately $20,000.00 on the con-
struction of the building, which was substantially completed. The lessee 
-11-
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refused to convey the property and lessor filed suit for specific performance, 
The trial court refused to grant specific performance upon the 
ground that the lessor (optionee) upon observing the construction of the 
building could not sit by, permit the lessee to proceed with the improvement 
and then invoke the aid of a court of equity to compel performance of the 
agreement. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated: 
"We agree with the rule applied by the trial court, but 
we disagree with its application to the facts. It is estab-
lished in this state and in equitable jurisprudence generally 
that specific performance will not be granted where the re-
sult would be oppressive, harsh or unjust. (Citing cases.] 
While facts establishing the injustice of the remedy generally 
arise out of the inception of the contract sought to be enforced, 
it is not necessary that such be the case. Subsequent events or 
a change of circumstances may so alter the situation as to ren-
der specific performance inequitable. (Citing authorities.] 
But any inequity that would result from specific performance 
of the agreement under consideration would not, in our opin-
ion, arise out of the failure of the appellant to communicate 
with the company upon learning of the construction . . • • 
"The inequity - and we think there would be inequity - in 
ordering specific performance of the contract according to 
its terms arises out of other factors. Performance would 
give the appellant the benefit of a bargain which she did not 
make and inflict upon the company a substantial loss. The 
loss. to be sure, would be occasioned by lack of proper dili-
gence on the part of the company's officials, but equity may 
nonetheless take the result into consideration in determining 
whether the contract will be enforced. (Citing cases.] 
"It is a corollary of the rule to which we have referred 
that if the plaintiff is not guilty of inequitable conduct and 
-12-
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if the granting of equitable relief can be framed in such 
a way as to avoid injustice to the defendant, specific p~r­
formance should be decreed •••• 
"We are of the opinion that specific performance should be 
granted upon condition that appellant pay the option price plus 
such appreciation in value to the appellant as the court may 
determine resulted from the improvement, not exceeding its 
cost. but reserving to the company the option of removing the 
improvement within a reasonable time. The decree should be 
so framed as to dismiss the complaint if appellant elects not 
to pay any increased amount." 
The same principle was enunciated in the case of Willard v. Tayloe, 
8 Wall. (U.S.) 557, 19 L. ed 501 (1870), where the court said: 
"It must also appear that the sped.fic performance will 
work no hardship or injustice, for if that result would follow, 
the court will leave the parties to their remedies at law, un-
less the granting of the specific relief can be accompanied 
with conditions that will obviate that result. " 
See also Lidikevicz v. Kopala, 315 Ill. 404, 146 N. E. 461 (1925) 
where the court granted specific performance but held that the vendors were 
entitled to reimbursement for repairs and improvements consisting of paint-
ing. decorating and plumbing made after the execution of the contract. 
And, in Mentlikowski v. Wisniewski, 173 Mich 642, 139 N. W. 
874 (1913) the court decreed specific performance, but held that defendants 
were entitled to be additionally compensated for permanent improvements 
such as pavement and cement sidewalks made after the execution of the con-
tract, upon the theory that no party is entitled to specific performance of 
-13-
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a contract as a matter of right, and that where specific performance is 
sought the party seeking it should do equity. 
See also, 71 Am Jur 2d, Specific Performance, Sec. 87, page 118. 
In this case the trial court refused to allow defendants tre value oi 
the improvements made after the execution of the option, although defendants 
proffered to prove that the improvements were made with the knowledge and 
the express agreement of plaintiff to pay for them in addition to the agreed pur-
chase price. In so ruling, the trial judge expressed the belief that he was 
bound (as to the purchase price) by the prior decree of specific performance 
entered on August 27, 1973, after the prior reversal on appeal. (Cooley trans-
cript p. 304.) 
However, that decree ordered defendants Mills and the other 
defendants in the first stage of this action to convey the property. At that 
time the property l"a d been conveyed to others who were not then parties to 
this action, so that it was impossible for defendants to comply with the decree. 
Normally, specific performance will not be decreed against a 
defendant who is unable to comply, such as where they have no title to the 
property sought. See, 71 Am. Jur. 2d, Specific Performance, Sec. 69, 
p. 99. Consequently, that decree was a nullity, since it was impossible of 
performance. 
-14-
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In this regard, it should be pointed out that after the first trial, 
judgment was entered against plaintiff. In connection with its appeal plain-
tiff filed a motion with the trial court to fix a supersedeas. The court en-
tered an order staying the enforcement of the judgment of dismissal~ 
restraining the original defendants from disposing of the property, condi-
tioned upon plaintiff's posting a bond in the amount of $50,000.00. However, 
plaintiff failed to post the bond, leaving defendants Mills free to rely on their 
judgment of dismissal, pursuant to which they subsequently conveyed the pro-
perty to Carole Lee Davis, which was the reason it was impossible to comply 
with the order. 
Furthermore, in spite of his statement that he was bound by the 
'-
purchase price fixed in the decree of specific performance ($86, 000. 00), the 
trail judge did in fact modify that amount on account of the barn in paragr~h 
14 of the Findings of Fact. (R. 227.) However, he failed to award any amount 
for other improvements of like nature. 
Since this is a proceeding in equity, this court can review the 
lower court's determination of factual questions as well as legal questions. 
The lower court should have exercised some lattitude and adjus-
ted the sales price when it appeared inequitable to enforce the option accord-
ing to its terms. 
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Defendants submit that it was error for the lower court to enforce 
the option without allowing defendants compensation for the capital improve-
ments constructed upon the property after the execution of the option and 
prior to its exercise. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILIJ:'.IG TO AWARD 
DEFENDANTS MILLS CREDIT IN THE SUM OF 
$35,000.00 AGAIJ:'.IST THE JUDGMENT AWARDED 
THE OTHER DEFENDANTS ON THEIR CROSS-
CLAIM. 
The uncontroverted evidence (admitted without objection from any 
one) was tlB. t after defendants Mills sold the property in question to Carole 
Lee Davis, they repurchased from her five acres, which included the home 
in which they reside. The consideration for this purchase was certain live-
stock and farm machinery having an agreed value of $35,000.00. (See Coole) 
transcript pp. 247-249. See also, Exhibits 11-P and 26-D which are the 
warranty deed to the land and the bill of sale to the personality, respectively. 
In its decisions the trail court ordered the entire parcel of realty 
conveyed to plaintiff. This would include the five acre parcel repurchased by 
defendants Mills from Carole Lee Davis for $35,000.00 worth of personal 
property to which plaintiff had no claim, and which Carole Lee Davis will 
not be required to convey to plaintiff. 
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The court also entered judgment against defendant Mills and in 
favor of Carole Lee Davis for the sum of $110,000.00 (constituting the pur-
chase price paid by Carole Lee Davis to the Mills for the purchase of the 
total acreage in question in this suit). 
However, defendant Mills should receive credit to the extent that 
they paid Carole Lee Davis new consideration (agreed value $35, 000. 00), for 
property which they will lose to plaintiff by the terms of the decree of speci-
fie performance. 
Consequently, the judgment on the cross-claim against Mills 
should be reduced by $35,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 54(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: 
"Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered 
by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his plead-
ings. It may be given for or against one or more of several 
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires 
it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side 
as between or among themselves. (Emphasis added.) 
It is respectfully submitted that in this case the court did not 
award the parties who prevailed the relief to which they were entitled - it 
granted them more than they were entitled to receive. 
This court should modify the Supplemental Decree of Specific 
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Performance by requiring plaintiff, as a condition to obtaining specific 
performance, to pay defendants Mills the sum of $35,748. 17 in addition 
to the option price of $86,200.00. 
This court should also modify the judgment awarded the other 
defendants on their cross-claim against defendants Mills by giving defendants 
Mills credit for the sum of $35, 000. 00 previously paid to repurchase the 
house and surrounding five acres, which defendant Mills will be forced to 
convey to plaintiff. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
b}J.l~~ 
G. MARSHALL 
ey for Defendants Mills 
cia! Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-18-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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I herewith certify that I served three (3) copies of the enclosed 
Brief on Appeal upon the other parties mailing the same on the ll_ day of 
June, 1978, postage prepaid as follows: 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Hidden Meadows Development Company 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
LEONARD RUSSON and JAMES SADLER 
Attorneys for Milton C. Christensen, Paradise 
Valley Estates, Inc., Lake Mills Co •• Carole Lee 
Christensen, and Environmental Resources, Inc. 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
Attorney for International Environmental 
Sciences 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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